The idea of a transcendental logic is that of a logic which gives an account of the origins of our knowledge as well as its relationship to objects.

In Kant's Transcendental Logic (1969), he examines Kant's claim that transcendental logic can generate a priori synthetic propositions.

He views Kant's transcendental logic as an extension of formal logic.

Kant nominated and explored the possibility of a transcendental logic with which to consider the deduction of the a priori in its pure form.

Kant reasoned that the pure a priori forms are established via his transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic.

The whole of this part of transcendental logic consists of two books, of which the one contains the conceptions, and the other the principles of pure understanding.

In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be distinguished from affirmative judgements, although in general logic they are rightly enough classed under affirmative.

On the other hand, the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations.

Understanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental logic a canon of objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and are comprehended in the analytical department of that logic.

In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles.