The mischief rule is the most flexible of the interpretation methods.

Under the Mischief rule the bicycle could constitute a carriage.

The other two are the "mischief rule" and the "golden rule."

The mischief rule saw further development in Corkery v Carpenter (1951).

The mischief rule is one of three rules of statutory interpretation traditionally applied by English courts.

They can use the mischief rule if the statute is ambiguous, but must not 'invent fancied ambiguities' in order to do so.

The historical source of purposive interpretation is the mischief rule established in Heydon's Case.

Heydon's Case (1584) laid out the following statement of the principles underlying what would come to be called the "mischief rule":

They may apply the "mischief rule".

The landmark decision in Heydon's Case introduces the mischief rule into the interpretation of statutes by the courts.

The mischief rule.

The case is considered a landmark because it was the first case to use what would come to be called the mischief rule for the interpretation of statutes.

Australian courts have departed from the traditional approach of interpreting statutes (the literal rule, the golden rule, and the mischief rule).

Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form of replacement for the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine cases.

In Construction of Statutes, Elmer Driedger defines the mischief rule as follows:

There is a fairly substantive body of decisions respecting construction of similar legislative language which has tended to favour a more liberal interpretation based on the mischief rule.

The mischief rule (also known as the purposive approach), is said to have originated from Heydon's case, decided by the ancient English Court of Exchequer in 1584.

The judge applied the mischief rule to come to the conclusion that they were guilty as the intention of the Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes.

Although it points to a kind of middle ground between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule, the golden rule is not, in a strict sense, a compromise between them.

In applying the Mischief Rule the court is essentially asking what part of the law did the law not cover, but was meant to be rectified by the parliament in passing the bill.

In the century in which it was created, and for some time thereafter, the mischief rule was used in a legislative environment very different from the one which has prevailed in the past two centuries.

The court applied the mischief rule holding that the activities of the defendant was within the mischief of the Act, and soliciting from within a house, is soliciting and molesting of the public.

The mischief rule is more flexible than the Golden or Literal rule, in that the mischief rule requires judges to look over four tasks to ensure that gaps within the law are covered.

The way in which the mischief rule can produce more sensible outcomes than those that would result if the literal rule were applied is illustrated by the ruling in Smith v Hughes [1960] 2 All E.R. 859.

The 'principle Against Doubtful penalisation' is also in this division although other presumptions are discussed in Division five which also contains an interesting treatment of purposive construction which the author regards as a modernized form of the mischief rule.