Claims about truth conditions, reference, and speech acts were the center of attention back then.

Both sentences have the same stimulus meaning and truth condition.

Usually, these particles do not directly change the sentence's meaning, in the sense that the truth conditions remain the same.

The reason for this is quite simply that these aspects of deixis mostly make no difference to truth conditions.

Some have asserted that meaning is nothing substantially more or less than the truth conditions they involve.

Giving the meaning of a sentence, he further argued, was equivalent to stating its truth conditions.

In semantics, truth conditions are which obtain precisely when a sentence is true.

Lukes concludes that different cultures cannot be expected to agree on the truth conditions of their beliefs.

In contrast, two leading theorists emphasize the fact that truth conditions cannot be specified for a metaphor.

The meaning of a sentence is conveyed if the truth conditions for the sentence are understood.

Understood this way, truth conditions are theoretical entities.

In semantics, the truth condition of a sentence is almost universally considered to be distinct from its meaning.

Additionally, there are many sentences that are understood although their truth condition is uncertain.

An explication of the conditional will also specify truth conditions for situations where "p" is not true.

Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions.

The truth condition for the new dynamic action modality is defined as follows:

One very influential programme was that of John Davidson, which made the meaning of the sentence simply its truth conditions.

All such sentences have the same truth conditions, but arguably do not thereby have the same meaning.

In philosophy, a sentence which asserts incomplete truth conditions for a proposition may be regarded as a truism.

In modern model theory, it follows immediately for the truth conditions for quantified sentences:

The theory uses the notion of a possible world in order to give its account of truth conditions for subjunctive conditionals.

This allows for moral discourse with shared standards, notwithstanding the descriptive properties or truth conditions of moral terms.

This usually implies translation into a formal language with a simpler semantics, and, using Tarski's definition, the determination of its truth conditions.

Natural language will only specify truth conditions for propositions of the form "If p, then q" for situations where "p" is true.

The truth conditions for the connectives of the epistemic language are the same as in epistemic logic (see above).