And he is right; our belief here would not track the truth.

This would be to hold that a justified belief is one which tracks the truth.

But & p ) is inconsistent with a false belief does not track the truth.

In the case of the police car, my belief fails to track the truth in both ways, and so is not knowledge.

Three reporters from The Post spent almost a week tracking the truth, holding back several days in the pursuit of on-the-record confirmation.

Explain what is involved in the claim that our best opinions about moral matters determine rather than merely track the truth about morals.

For someone who takes his belief that p to be justified is surely close to taking it that his belief tracks the truth of p.

Robert Morgenthau, the Manhattan District Attorney, is the obvious choice for any Administration intent on finding and tracking the truth.

Our normal view is that our past-tense self-ascriptions track the truth about independently-existing, past intentional states; what needs explaining is how they manage to do so.

Having done our best to banish scepticism, we ask whether knowledge goes beyond justified true belief and look at the case for defining knowledge in terms of 'tracking the truth'.

Tracking the Truth", DB2 Magazine (IBM), information about IBM's role in the project."

Nozick believed the counterfactual conditionals bring out an important aspect of our intuitive grasp of knowledge: For any given fact, the believer's method must reliably track the truth despite varying relevant conditions.

(a) The requirement that the belief that p should track the truth of p is a requirement that the first two clauses of the theory should be related in a certain way.

Nozick suggested a "truth tracking" theory of knowledge, in which the x was said to know P if x's belief in P tracked the truth of P through the relevant modal scenarios.

The British philosopher Simon Blackburn has criticized this formulation by suggesting that we do not want to accept as knowledge beliefs, which, while they "track the truth" (as Nozick's account requires), are not held for appropriate reasons.

What the diffident schoolboy has lost is the confidence that his beliefs are tracking the truth; he takes it that, although he does believe that p, it is at least as probable that he is wrong as that he is right.

There are a number of alternatives proposed, including Robert Nozick's arguments for a requirement that knowledge 'tracks the truth' and Simon Blackburn's additional requirement that we do not want to say that those who meet any of these conditions 'through a defect, flaw, or failure' have knowledge.