theory of justification

See theories of justification for other views on the idea.

Interestingly, theories of justification generally include other aspects of epistemology, such as knowledge.

We can, if we want, restore the possibility of a conditional theory of justification by a move like the one made in 2.4.

Lehrer is perhaps best known for his defense of the coherence theory of justification in epistemology.

More generally, theories of justification focus on the justification of statements or propositions.

Different theories of justification require different amounts and types of evidence before a belief can be considered justified.

The main theories of justification include:

One is the coherence theory of truth; the other, the coherence theory of justification.

Epistemology is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, such as the relationships between truth, belief, and theories of justification.

Evidentialism is a theory of justification according to which the justification of a belief depends solely on the evidence for it.

Indeed, his theory of justification depended upon the divinity of Christ and his Trinitarian status.

If a theory like this were available, we would have reintroduced in a roundabout way the possibility of a conditional theory of justification.

Both coherence and foundationalist theories of justification attempt to answer the regress argument, a fundamental problem in epistemology that goes as follows.

See Goldmans Theory of justification.

(b) We considered whether the causal theory of knowledge either rested on or made available a causal theory of justification.

The theory of justification is the part of epistemology that attempts to understand the justification of propositions and beliefs.

One way of explaining the theory of justification is to say that a justified belief is one that we are "within our rights" in holding.

Conditional Theory of Justification (Reliabilism): A belief is justified by a set of beliefs.

What distinguishes coherentism from other theories of justification is that the set is the primary bearer of justification.

Traditional theories of justification (foundationalism and coherentism) and indeed most philosophers consider an infinite regress not to be a valid justification.

Any proposal which amounts to a new theory of justification may succeed in showing that in the Gettier cases the relevant true beliefs were not justified at all.

Fogelin claims to detect a suspicious resemblance between the Theories of Justification and Agrippa's five modes leading to the suspension of belief.

Moving this way, then, we would be starting from a causal theory of justification; the causal theory of knowledge would simply be one of its consequences.

The coherentist theory of justification characterizes epistemic justification as a property of a belief only if that belief is a member of a coherent set.

On this view, those who offer reliabilist theories of justification further analyze the 'justification' part of the traditional analysis of 'knowledge' in terms of reliable processes.