A name functions as a rigid designator, while a definite description does not.

He points out that proper names, in contrast to most descriptions, are rigid designators.

Kripke refers to names used in this way as rigid designators.

Terms that are true across all possible worlds in this way are called "rigid designators".

He called such directly referring proper names "rigid designators".

Rigid designators include proper names as well as certain natural kind terms like biological species and substances.

Hence, names are rigid designators, according to Kripke.

They reject, therefore, the contention that 'water' is a rigid designator referring to HO.

One interesting consequence of Kripke semantics is that identities involving rigid designators are necessary.

Moreover, a name, in Kripke's view, is a rigid designator, which refers to the same object in all possible worlds.

Both rigid designators and vivid designators are similarly dependent on context and empty otherwise.

Rigidity should not be confused with Kripke's notion of Rigid Designators, which are particulars.

These referents are considered rigid designators in the Kripkean sense and are disseminated outward to the linguistic community.

Any referential term descriptive of a genuine individuating feature of the object concerned is by definition a "rigid designator".

(5) The concept of a rigid designator, though the actual name of the concept was coined by Kripke.

Whether or not this being should be described as God turns on whether the label 'Creator' is a rigid designator of God.

Rigid designator (section Causal-Historical Theory of Reference)

(Essentialism, the necessity of identity, and rigid designators form an important troika of mutual interdependence.)

Rigid designators are contrasted with non-rigid or flaccid designators, which may designate different things in different possible worlds.

However, itself is not a rigid designator with respect to the modality ; if it denotes 3 before incrementing , it denotes 4 after.

Kripke interpreted proper names as rigid designators where a rigid designator picks out the same object in every possible world (Kripke 1980).

In the expression named entity, the word named restricts the task to those entities for which one or many rigid designators, as defined by Kripke, stands for the referent.

What detective story, for example, makes allusions to Monte Carlo computer simulations, Bertrand Russell's barber paradox and the philosopher Saul Kripke's concept of a rigid designator?

It is the analogue, in the sense of believing, of a rigid designator, which is (refers to) the same in all possible worlds, rather than is just believed to be so.

Thus if it does not make sense to suppose that the designatum of "A" might be different from what it is, then "A" is a rigid designator, otherwise it is non-rigid.