Several important economic studies strongly support the median voter theorem.

It is also predicted by the median voter theorem in political science.

This expectation is based on the median voter theorem.

Of course, the median voter theorem is far from a complete explanation of politics.

Finally, the median voter theorem applies best to a majoritarian election system.

The median voter theorem seems to explain some of the things that happen in majoritarian voting systems.

The median voter theorem implies that voters have an incentive to vote for their true preferences.

The median voter theorem makes two key assumptions.

If voters are considering more than one issue simultaneously, the median voter theorem is inapplicable.

Second, the median voter theorem reflects that radical candidates or parties rarely get elected.

A larger problem for the median voter theorem, however, is the incentives structure for government representatives.

These assumptions are in line with other established theories in political science, including the median voter theorem.

The Supreme Court’s recent ruling on campaign spending also comes into clearer focus through the median voter theorem.

The median voter theorem has several limitations.

However, because of the median voter theorem, only a few people actually make the decisions in the country, and many may be unhappy with those decisions.

The strong form of the median voter theorem says the median voter always gets his most preferred policy.

See the median voter theorem.

THE median voter theorem doesn’t predict that the legacy of the Obama administration will be a wash.

One of these is median voter theorem, which holds that the party that manages to occupy the ideological ground closest to the centre wins.

According to the median voter theorem third parties will rarely, if ever, win elections for the same reason why extreme candidates do not tend to win.

The weak form of the median voter theorem says the median voter always casts his or her vote for the policy that is adopted.

The median voter theorem states that "a majority rule voting system will select the outcome most preferred by the median voter".

Buchanan and Tollison also note that this is a problem for the median voter theorem, which assumes that decisions can be made on a one-dimensional field.

With the median voter theorem in particular, Krehbiel argues that voters' inability to directly amend legislation acts against the theorem.

Levitt's work on politics includes papers on the effects of campaign spending, on the median voter theorem, and on the effects of federal spending.