incentive compatibility

The implementation of social choice rules: some results on incentive compatibility.

The researcher need only look at the set of equilibrium characterized by incentive compatibility.

Hurwicz invented the economic sciences of incentive compatibility and mechanism design.

As an illustration, voting systems which create incentives to vote dishonestly lack the property of incentive compatibility.

Scaling up programs quickly is difficult, so some compromises with respect to targeting, incentive compatibility, and accountability may be needed.

Hurwicz introduced and formalized the concept of incentive compatibility.

That is why the incentive compatibility is needed to ensure binding contracts, in imperfect capital markets.

As a result, some otherwise non-optimal elements may have to be built into the contractual structure, some incentive compatibility constraints.

Strategyproofness is also known as Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility.

He originated incentive compatibility and mechanism design, which show how desired outcomes are achieved in economics, social science and political science.

Experiments and surveys are at risk of systemic biases, strategic behavior and lack of incentive compatibility.

The principle allows one to solve for a Bayesian equilibrium by assuming all players truthfully report type (subject to an incentive compatibility constraint).

Introduces the well-known MDP process for public goods, demonstrates convergence and provides an early analysis of incentive compatibility.

The theory of incentive compatibility that Hurwicz developed changed the way many economists thought about outcomes, explaining why centrally planned economies may fail and how incentives for individuals make a difference in decision making.

"Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in Social Goals and Social Organization, edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and Hugo Sonnenschein, Cambridge University Press (1985), 229-259.

Though Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem prove that any useful single-winner voting system based on preference ranking is prone to some kind of manipulation, some use game theory to search for some kind of "minimally manipulatable" (incentive compatibility) voting schemes.