Four central sciences have been selected against which to test and improve the causal dispositionalist hypothesis.

In any event, Carruthers' dispositionalist account is saddled with the same representational problems.

In addition, I present criticisms of Carruthers' dispositionalist HOT theory.

But how plausible is Carruthers' dispositionalist version of the HOT theory, with its attached special-purpose short-term memory store?

In addition, I argue that dispositionalist HORs face an apparent counterexample, one which Carruthers does not consider.

Alternately, the dispositionalist can posit a force that blocks certain HOTs with thimble content from even being disposed to be tokened.

Furthermore, even in Carruthers' dispositionalist scheme, HOT must at least sometimes conceptualize perceptual experience (or else what is the force of "dispositional"?)

The dispositionalist mirrors the actualist view except that the first-order mental state needn't actually be thought about-it only needs to be available to potentially be thought about.

At the very least, this sort of reply to the error-theory, a dispositionalist reply, would have to respond to the claim that it was at odds with the phenomenology of colour experience.

Dispositionalist HOT theory provides the answer -- the contents of the one channel are available to higher-order recognition and thought, whereas the contents of the other(s) are not (see section 2)

In any event, it seems that the dispositionalist theorist will need to develop this type of framework, if the HOTs are to have any role at all in our consciousness of sensory states.

He introduces the notion of "availability" almost as an afterthought, in order to avoid the redundant computational complexity required for an "actualist," as opposed to a "dispositionalist," version of HOT theory.