It will be easiest to do this if we concentrate on dispositionalism about colour.

Dispositionalism is the general tendency to prefer dispositional attribution rather than situational attribution.

"Dispositionalism: A Defense Against Kripke's Criticisms," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol.

Armstrong rejects dispositionalism, the idea that dispositional properties (or powers as they are sometimes referred to) are ontologically significant and have an important role in explaining laws of nature.

Dispositionalism is offered as an alternative to other accounts of laws of nature including neo-Humean regularity theories and relations-between-universals theory of David Malet Armstrong, Fred Dretske, and Michael Tooley.

Dispositionalism is the idea that the dispositions of objects (for instance, the disposition for a wine glass to break if dropped on a hard floor) are a specific and ontologically important set of properties (either universals or tropes) that objects have.

While this dispositionalism quite successfully deals with the objection that one can feel or think one thing and do another, it is not enough - "it seems obvious as anything is obvious that there is something actually going on in me that constitutes my thought".

Armstrong believes that the challenge that dispositionalism presents for his account of laws of nature is not in the case of manifested dispositions (say, a glass dropping on the ground and breaking) but unmanifested dispositions (the fact that counter factually if one were to drop the glass on the ground, it would break).