Bayesian probability figures out the likelihood that something will happen based on available evidence.

Bayesian probability has been developed by many important contributors.

These arguments take the use of Bayesian probability as given, and are thus subject to the same postulates.

It is specifically based on the use of Bayesian probabilities to summarise evidence.

Three corollaries are given for the sixth principle, which amount to Bayesian probability.

These are Bayesian probabilities, which are based on an expert assessment of the available evidence.

Broadly speaking, there are two views on Bayesian probability that interpret the 'state of knowledge' concept in different ways.

Such a probability is known as a Bayesian probability.

The classical definition enjoyed a revival of sorts due to the general interest in Bayesian probability.

Subsequently some researchers opted for non-monotonic logic and Bayesian probability.

In Bayesian probability, this is the simplest non-informative prior.

The use of Bayesian probability involves specifying a prior probability.

This interpretation is often contrasted with Bayesian probability.

Bayesian probability specifies that there is some prior probability.

A Bayesian probability analysis then gives the probability that the object is present based on the actual number of matching features found.

Cox's theorem has come to be used as one of the justifications for the use of Bayesian probability theory.

Bayesian probability is often found to be difficult when analysing and assessing probabilities due to its initial counter intuitive nature.

One method is to calculate the posterior probability density function of Bayesian probability theory.

His research interests revolve around the Bayesian probability theory - mathematics for inferring, or reasoning using probability.

'Bayesian probability' is one of the most popular interpretations of the concept of probability.

The use of Bayesian probability raises the philosophical debate as to whether it can contribute valid justifications of belief.

Philosopher and theologian Richard Swinburne reaches the opposite conclusion using Bayesian probability.

In Bayesian probability, one needs to establish prior probabilities for the various hypotheses before applying Bayes' theorem.

In probability theory, credence means a subjective estimate of probability, as in Bayesian probability.

Spiegelhalter showed that while frequentist probability did not lend itself to expert systems, Bayesian probability most certainly did.