Desire, belief, and so on, are thus called propositional attitudes when they take this sort of content.

Propositional attitudes have directions of fit: some are meant to reflect the world, others to influence it.

"The main reason for which one simply cannot say 'propositional attitudes are relations with propositions.

A propositional attitude is a relational mental state connecting a person to a proposition.

The role of propositional attitudes in truth-conditional semantics is controversial.

Another objection within representational theory of mind has to do with the relationship between propositional attitudes and representation.

These basic concepts, in combination, may form basic propositional attitudes about things and events.

In relation to the mind, propositions are discussed primarily as they fit into propositional attitudes.

In the psychological sense, belief is a representational mental state that takes the form of a propositional attitude.

If, as Wittgenstein claims, propositional attitudes are not causes, then this would turn out to be meaningless.

The propositional attitudes of the mind are token mental representations with semantic properties.

Daniel Dennett holds a similar interpretationist view of propositional attitudes.

Often "pre-theoretical belief" refers to these basic propositional attitudes.

In philosophy of mind and psychology, mental states are often taken to primarily consist in propositional attitudes.

Russell resolves the problem of ambiguity in propositional attitude reports in a similar manner.

We attribute propositional attitudes to the computer and this helps us to explain and predict its behavior in various contexts.

Moreover, sentence meanings may be dependent upon propositional attitudes: those features that are relative to someone's beliefs, desires, and mental states.

Polarity items are licensed with directive propositional attitudes but not with epistemic ones.

Patients with dorsolateral frontal cortex lesions have difficulty discerning propositional attitude.

The referents of sentences embedded in propositional attitude ascriptions and other opaque contexts are their usual senses.

A multiplication program on a computer computes in the computer language of 1's and 0's, yielding representations that do not correspond with any propositional attitude.

"Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" Journal of Philosophy 53.

Much of folk psychology involves the attribution of intentional states (or more specifically as a subclass, propositional attitudes).

A related problem is how someone's propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract.

The eliminativist's claim with respect to qualia is that there is no unbiased evidence for such experiences when regarded as something more than propositional attitudes.