Section 11 itself is not predicated upon nor does it invoke the idea of causation.

There is also a growing interest in the metaphysics of medicine, particularly the idea of causation.

But Hume insists that our idea of causation also includes a mysterious necessary connection linking cause to effect.

The idea of second is predominant in the ideas of causation and of statical force.

(Hesslow, 1981)(iii) There are the greatest difficulties in fitting the particular theories of probability into any probabilistic idea of causation.

Here Hume embarks on his celebrated examination of causation, beginning with the question From what impression do we derive our idea of causation?

(This "constant conjunction" is promptly filed alongside contiguity and priority, in Hume's still-developing account of our idea of causation.)

Routine in perceptions is a relative term; the idea of causation is extracted by conceptual processes from phenomena, it is neither a logical necessity, nor an actual experience.

This includes modern ideas of causation, such as wanting or needing something to be, or those that give a purpose to behaviour Example: The reason why the artist wanted to make the statue.

The idea of secondness "is predominant in the ideas of causation" coming into being as "an action and reaction" between ourselves and some other, or between ourselves and a stimulus.

But our idea of causation is alone derivable from the constant conjunction of objects and the consequent inference of one from the other; and, reasoning experimentally, we can only infer from effects causes exactly adequate to those effects.

It is often associated with or in constant concomitance by the philosopher David Hume who used the phrase with great regularity in his discussion of the limits of empiricism to provide an explanation for our ideas of causation and inference.

Let them first discuss a more simple question, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another.